Book Review: Bad Blood

In Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup (Amazon,) author John Carreyrou chronicles the fraud that was Theranos.

For those who don’t know about Theranos, it was a Silicon Valley unicorn that claimed to have invented a device that would run over 200 diagnostic tests on single drop of your blood. A pin-prick was all that took. Turned out that they had invented no such device. But that didn’t stop them from selling it to drug chains and supermarket stores and conducting over a million blood tests. The author was instrumental in blowing its cover at the Wall Street Journal. Theranos subsequently recalled the results of all of its tests and has recently decided to dissolve itself after top executives were indicted for defrauding investors.

Hardware is hard. Healthcare is harder still. It takes over 10 years and $2 billion to get a drug to market. There is a reason for that. The first goal is healthcare is to “do no harm.” Trying to mesh this with the Silicon Valley ethos of “build fast and break things” is a recipe for disaster. You cannot code away bottlenecks created by physics, biology and chemistry that easily. To make matters worse, the Theranos CEO seemed to have embraced two other adages – “fake it till you make it” and “better to ask for forgiveness than to wait for permission.” Works fine when you are trying to sell an app.

The Valley is full of stories about how many big software companies that we know today would never have existed if they had played it straight. There is this story about Oracle labeling the buggy first version of its database as “version 2” (because nobody would buy version 1.0) and sending a team of engineers to get it working on the client site (they sold it as a “product” because it would allow them to charge more, but in effect, it was really a service that required an on-site team.) Then there is Uber that brazenly broke taxi regulations everywhere and then hired lobbyists to change them in its favor. However, the stories that are celebrated are that of survivors. Those who couldn’t “make it” or couldn’t successfully get “forgiveness” ended up being shuttered and forgotten.

Key take-ways form the Theranos saga:

  • The board of directors have a duty to keep the CEO on the straight and the narrow.
  • Investors should at least talk to a few of a company’s customers before committing capital to it.
  • High staff turnover is a red flag.
  • Not having a full-time CFO in a large company is another red flag.
  • Deals not turning into revenue and revenue not turning into cash in the bank is the reddest flag.

Recommendation: Read it now!

Macro: NIFTY vs. INR/OIL Correlation, Part III

This is the last part of the study. Part I, Part II

The reason why a linear model between NIFTY and USDINR built in Part II failed could have been because:

  1. Weekly returns were not appropriate for the relationship. Perhaps INR affects NIFTY at a higher frequency.
  2. There is no linear relationship because a rising/falling INR. Changes are not uniformly good/bad.

One way to visualize it is to plot the NIFTY returns density at different USDINR return thresholds. If there is no obvious difference in the densities between NIFTY returns when USDINR is positive vs. when it is negative, one could conclude that there is no straight forward relationship between the two.

Here is the NIFTY weekly returns density when USDINR is going up (the rupee is depreciating):
density plot NIFTY vs. USDINR
Note the curve when USDINR weekly returns are greater than 0.5% vs. when are greater than 2%. There is a bearish bias.

And, NIFTY weekly returns density when USDINR is going down (the rupee is appreciating):
density plot NIFTY vs. USDINR

If you juxtapose the above densities, it is apparent that when the rupee is appreciating, the densities skew right, And when the rupee is depreciating, there is a left skew. These charts show that there is “a” relationship – just not what can be captured by a linear model.

Code and density plots for NIFTY vs. OIL can be found on github.

Macro: NIFTY vs. INR/OIL Correlation, Part II

This is a continuation of the correlation study of Part I
Our correlation study showed a -0.54 between NIFTY 50 and USDINR whereas a 0.21 with OIL. Here, we will use weekly returns of the NIFTY and USDINR to build a simple linear model.

Building a linear model

A weak correlation doesn’t usually lend itself to a useful linear model. To illustrate this point, have a look at the diagnostics below:
NIFTY~INR linear model
Ideally, the ‘Residuals vs. Fitted’ plot should show residuals evenly distributed around the zero line – it doesn’t. The Q-Q plot should lie on the diagonal – it is marred by heavy tails. Hence, we should scale-down our expectations from the model.

For this post, we will split the time-series that we have into a “training set” that goes from 2010-01-01 to 2015-12-31 and a “test set” that goes from 2016-01-01 to 2018-09-30. We will build the model with the former and test it with the latter.

Results

Predicted vs. actual weekly NIFTY 50 returns:
actual.vs.pred.NIFTY50
To test our model, we will give it the actual NIFTY 50 returns (x-axis) and plot the predict NIFTY 50 returns (y-axis.) The problem here is immediately apparent: it is heavily bullish! It consistently gives a positive prediction.

Long and Long-short cumulative returns:
linear.model.cumulative.NIFTY50
If we use our model to go long-only (L) or long-short (LS), we get the cumulative returns shown above. The model is no better than buy-and-hold (at least it is no worse, so there is that.)

Take-away

A weak correlation between NIFTY 50 and USDINR is not much to work with and a linear model built over that relationship is no better than buy-and-hold. Given the narrative spun by the media, it is tough to wrap ones head around the results above.

We conclude with density charts of weekly NIFTY returns under different USDINR return thresholds in Part III.

Code and charts on github.

Macro: NIFTY vs. INR/OIL Correlation, Part I

We have all come across these type of headlines recently:
Sensex, Nifty fall further on surging crude oil prices (LiveMint)
Sensex, Nifty drop on fresh spurt in oil price, fall in rupee (ET)
But what exactly is the correlation between the NIFTY, USDINR and OIL?

Macro Caveats

A host of factors affect the prices of a widely tracked benchmark index like the NIFTY. Some of which are intrinsic (valuation, for example) and some that are external (capital flows, for example.) There relationships are dynamic – they keep changing over time.

Also, macro variables usually have a time-alignment problem. For example, the closing-prices of the NIFTY don’t align with the closing prices of, say, the NASDAQ. So to analyze the NIFTY and NASDAQ together, the time-series need to be shifted. And, perhaps, NASDAQ futures being traded at NIFTY close should be considered instead.

Comparing commodity and currency time-series with equity time-series has another problem. The former trades 24/7 in a global marketplace whereas equities predominantly trade in the local time-zone. So “closing” prices for commodities and currencies are hard to pin down at a granular level across markets. One way to tide over this issue is by using a weekly or monthly time-series instead of a daily one.

Time-periods

For the longest time, Indian markets were insulated from global capital flows. It is only recently that we have opened up both or economy and our markets. Currency futures started trading only in 2008 and the RBI still tries to “guide” the exchange rate. With these in mind, lets run the correlation between the NIFTY 50, USDINR and OIL weekly return time-series with NIFTY 50 lagged by on time-period.

NIFTY50.INR.OIL correlations

Data from 1995 through 2018 shows only a small correlation between NIFTY and INR. However, like we mentioned above, Indian markets now are more open than what they were before. So, if you run the same correlations on a smaller dataset – year 2010 through 2018 – we can see an uptick in the NIFTY-INR correlation.

NIFTY50.INR.OIL correlations

Take-away

It appears that the NIFTY has a closer relationship with INR than with OIL prices. In Part II of this thread, we will check if we can build a linear model that can capture this relationship. Stay tuned.

Code and charts are on github.

Broker Industry Snapshot 2018-09

There are a lot of conflicting statistics regarding the brokerage industry in India. Depending on the source of the data and what gets counted, one ends up with different numbers. The numbers vary depending on whether only unique demat accounts (based on PAN) are measured, the definition of an “active” account, whether purely derivative accounts are to be included, etc. The NSE has been publishing aggregated statistics for “active” accounts (measured by UCC) for different brokers for a while now. Below are some charts constructed from that data.

Number of active accounts

It looks like SEBI’s drive to redefine an “active” account lead to large scale deactivation of accounts in 2013-14. Duplicate accounts notwithstanding, you could tell that its a bull market by the 40% jump in active accounts between FY2016-17 and FY2017-18. However, 80 lakh total active accounts looks skinny.

The changing face of the industry


According to the latest numbers available, top 20 brokers by market-share (based on number of active accounts) had cornered 76% of the market, compared to 69% back in FY2010-11. The top 5 have further widened the lead with the rest. However, there has been a lot of churn in the leadership. At current growth rates, it appears that it is only a matter of time before discount broking displaces full-service broking.

We don’t have much more to add at this point but we will keep yanking on this thread over the days to come.