Author: shyam

Finance + Research

Ran across a couple of interesting posts on research in finance.

First, the difference between science and magic:

Magic is based on belief in a set of rituals. A person will only consult a magician if they have faith in the actions that the magician will perform. Science is not based on belief in its theorems, the equivalent of magic’s rituals, but on a belief in the process by which science is created.

Second, the need for scientific research to be conducted in the open:

For science to be reputable and maintain a divide with magic, it needs to be carried out, like religion, in the open. As soon as either science or religion takes place out of the public arena, they risk degenerating into magic.

Third, research in finance is devolving into magic, because it is conducted behind closed doors:

The science, the mathematics, is not being used to enlighten finance but to obscure its practices. Recently the report on J.P. Morgan’s London Whale revealed how tweaking their model, the bank could reduce their apparent exposure from around $40 billion to $20 billion. The Whale report highlights how finance is actually more committed to ‘rituals’ around risk management than the ‘science’ of risk management, and this seems to be facilitated by mathematics.

Fourth, the incumbent gatekeepers will have none of the openness:

Reed Elsevier, which owns many of the most prestigious research journals in the world, has been sending mass research takedown notices to everyone from startups like Academia.edu to individual researchers and universities. They want final articles need to be “readily discoverable and citable via the journal itself.” They’ve been asking researchers to take down their work.

Fifth, it is not enough to just make papers public, but also the underlying data in a machine-readable format:

Reinhart and Rogoff wrote in their 2010 paper that average annual growth was -0.1% in countries with episodes of gross government debt equal to 90% or more of GDP between 1945 and 2009. This was picked up by politicians to push an austerity driven fiscal policy. But it turned out that the researchers had made some Excel errors. Krugman went so far as to say that it was excluded on purpose because those rows contained data for high-debt countries with decent growth immediately after World War II, which would have greatly weakened their result.

So the only way research can be scientific is for it to be open. But incumbent businesses want to force it behind pay-ways. The way this works out is going to be a big deal.

Source:
Is finance guided by good science or convincing magic?
Elsevier’s Research Takedown Notices Fan Out To Startups, Harvard, Individual Academics
Reinhart, Rogoff, and the Excel Error That Changed History
Holy Coding Error, Batman

Which side of the trade are you on?

We are big fans of Research Affiliates, the latest piece from Jason Hsu hits the nail on the head:

 

Because sentiment is contagious, because timing price corrections is hard, because we all want to brag about our four-bagger stock picks, because irrational markets can outlast our conviction and courage—we look the value gift horse in the mouth and protest, “But there is a risk that the fundamentals continue to deteriorate and this cheap firm gets cheaper.” Or we say, “This company could be the next Google and Apple; at the current 600 PE, it is attractively priced. Let’s hold it longer.”

 

Its very hard, going in, to tell the difference between “value” and “value trap.” But telling the difference may not be as important as being able to overcome our own behavioral tendencies.

 

The dread of catching a falling knife and the desire to collect the greatest possible gain are not wrong qualitatively. It is absolutely true that many value stocks eventually go bust and that some growth stocks go on to become the next Google. The fear and greed are just off quantitatively.

 

Source: Who Is On the Other Side of the Trade?

Related:
Inside the Mind of a Lemming
Strategy Performance Roundup

Salman Khan vs Aamir Khan of Investing

I was watching Salman Khan’s interview in Koffee With Karan and had an aaha moment that I would like to share with you. When Karan asked Salman about the earlier part of his career, Salman admitted that he used to do movies just because his friends would ask him to. He used to act in movies where knew the script was bad but he figured “banthe banthe ban jayeegi” and did it anyways. What resulted was a string of disastrous movies and Bollywood basically wrote him off.

Salman Khan in an Auto Window

And then there is Aamir Khan. Does at most one movie a year. Pours his heart and soul into it. The general impression is that he wouldn’t take up a role in a movie that has a bad script.

Salman plays Salman in all his (recent) movies. Aamir basically tears himself apart and puts back the pieces to fit the character he is playing.

Salman does the same movie every year, Aamir apparently rejects 200 scripts in a year.

There a number of lessons we can draw about the seemingly different approaches that these successful actors have.

Know what you want

It is very important to know what you want… out of life, out of investing, out of a career. Once you know what you want, the rest of the decisions fall in place. For example, Aamir wants to make movies that wins awards and makes decent money at the box-office. Salman is happy if his movies are a box-office hit, he hasn’t really won any awards, and doesn’t care.

Salman runs a diversified high-beta portfolio, Aamir runs a concentrated value portfolio.

Know that it always involves a lot of work

Aamir Khan attended the Energy Globe Awards at...

Irrespective of what your end-goal is, be prepared to put in the work for it. Aamir might focus on the script and making sure that he plays the part. While Salman is obsessing over making sure his movies live up to the expectations of his fan base. They both know their audience and work to keep them happy.

Salman sticks to a model that has been back-tested. Aamir tries to ferret out opportunities that other participants may have overlooked.

The work has to follow a process

Both of Aamir’s search for the perfect script and Salman’s search for the smash-hit are all supported by a process that is largely invisible (and boring) to the public eye. Aamir’s production house has a three stage evaluation process for each of the 10-15 scripts that they receive each month. Salman rejects anything that even has a hint of being “non-commercial.”

Salman would probably like our momentum/velocity themes – bet on stocks that are already working. Aamir might like our value themes – bet on stocks that are fundamentally good, yet under-priced.

Salman, pre-pyaar kiya to darna kya, is how most new investors approach the market. AKA, the Friends, Family and CNBC approach to investing. But it is only after a string of failures do they realize that they need to take a step back and figure things out.

So the key takeaways are: know what you want, work for it and have a repeatable process.

So… which Khan are you?

Apollo Tyres: Buyer’s Remorse, Part III

A Delaware court rejected an appeal by Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (CTB) to force a $2.5 billion takeover by Apollo Tyres. Apollo wanted to cut its $35-a-share offer by as much as $9, citing the labor issues.

The move puts the deal’s fate back in the hands of a lower state court. If Cooper doesn’t get a ruling in its favor by Dec. 31, Apollo can terminate the contract.

Cooper is still trying to resolve a lockout at its Chinese factory and remains unable to deliver updated financial statements to Apollo, which says it needs the information to sell bonds to pay for the deal. As an alternative to a settlement or paying what it originally agreed, Apollo could hand over a $112.5 million “reverse breakup fee” to walk away.

Meanwhile, CTB shares plunge in NYSE:

Not sure how this will play out but the biggest question is why are these issues coming to light 6 months after the deal was announced? Isn’t it the job of M&A advisers to dig up these things? Morgan Stanley and Deutsche Bank served as financial advisors to Apollo. If these issues were known before hand, as CTB alleges, then what was the Apollo board thinking? Isn’t this also a failure on part of the board to supervise its CEO?

I would avoid Apollo Tyres purely based on the colossal supervisory failure of both the management and the board. What is to stop these jokers from doing this all over again?

Sources:
Apollo Rises After Court Rejects Cooper Appeal on Deal
Court Dismisses Cooper Tire Appeal of Ruling on Stalled Takeover
Apollo Tyres to Acquire Cooper Tire & Rubber Company
Apollo Tyres: Buyer’s Remorse
Apollo Tyres: Buyer’s Remorse, Part Deux